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Commentary
By Stephen E. Kalish*
The Attorney's Role in the Private
Organization'
What should be the ethical posture of the professional in the
modern organization? This essay explores the plausibility of one
tentative answer for one class of professionals-the attorneys. It is
put forward to shock the law profession with its extremism, and
then to temper the blow with its possibility. It is meant to generate
discussion, and the search for solutions to the problems described;
it is not offered as necessarily the best solution. It is furthermore
hoped that the paper will stimulate professional groups other than
attorneys.
I. THE DILEMMA
In the last quarter of the twentieth century, the attorney faces a
crisis. In many senses it is a crisis of his own making. At the turn
of the century, the lawyer's role in society was understandable and
workable. Since then, the role has become unworkable; social and
professional factors have changed while role concepts have re-
mained constant. The result is the dilemma discussed in this es-
say.
American society at the turn of the century is often referred to
as individualistic, chaotic and anarchistic. This misplaces the em-
phasis. Instead, society of that time perceived itself as a machine,
and individuals were expected to subordinate their private con-
sciences in order to promote the public good. Individuals were
seen as mere cogs in the social machine.
In the world of private business, production was systemized.
The modern corporation, with all its demands, became the major
force of production. Scientific management became a guiding
watchword. Underlying this social and economic development was
the notion that employees ought to be loyal to their employers.
Employees were to sacrifice their personal, political and moral in-
* Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law; BA., 1964, J.D., 1967,
LL.M., 1974, Harvard University.
1. This paper was delivered to the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Phi Beta
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clinations in order to be productive "team-players." Insubordina-
tion became the leading corporate sin.
The organization model, which I will call this regime, required
loyalty in order to achieve efficiency. The law reflected these
needs. Most employees were said to be employees at will. This
meant that an employer could fire an employee for any reason, or
for no reason. Of course, the individual worker might have had a
private conscience, but she was to leave it at home. If she exer-
cised her private conscience on the job in a manner which the em-
ployer interpreted as insubordinate or disloyal, she could be fired.
Most employees, therefore, decided to keep their jobs and to play
by the company rules. The private conscience was subordinated to
the organization which could efficiently produce for the public
good.
The private conscience was also subordinated to the public
good in areas of society other than private organizations. Profes-
sionals, such as attorneys, were asked to play a role in which they
too had to forego the call of personal, political and moral con-
science. In other words, the attorney was asked to shed his private
conscience and to adopt a professional conscience which would
lead him to professionally acceptable conduct. In many cases, the
attorney became his role, and the professional conscience became
his own. Although it could be argued that society lost a morally-
free person in this process, it gained an attorney who could be
counted on to behave consistently with society's expectations. The
attorney thus became a cog in the machine, fostering efficient pri-
vate planning and thus enhancing the public good.
Near the turn of the century, institutions were developed to fos-
ter this strong sense of professionalism, and attorneys were social-
ized to accept a set of internalized responsiblities which their
professional role entailed. The function of the lawyer was defined
by unauthorized practice laws; only certified lawyers could per-
form these jobs. Law schools developed to monitor the initiation
and socialization rites. Bar associations were formed to control ad-
mission and discipline. Codes of conduct were written. The attor-
ney was shaped to become his role and to adopt, as his own, the
professional conscience.
I will call this regime the professional model. Its importance as
a device for controlling social behavior, was recognized at the time.
In 1924, John W. Davis, the Democratic Presidential nominee and
an attorney, was criticized for having represented J.P. Morgan and
company. He responded by stating that his professional role,
rather than-or even in spite of-his personal feelings or con-
science, required that he represent all who requested his services.
As he stated: "Since the law, however, is a profession and not a
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trade, I conceive it to be the duty of the lawyer, just as it is the duty
of the priest or the surgeon, to serve those who call on him unless,
indeed, there is some insuperable obstacle in the way.' 2 In Davis,
or at least so he said, society had a reliable and predictable tool.
To state that attorneys acted as their professional role and con-
science dictated does not explain what this role entailed. The pro-
fessional model of this period had two constitutive elements. First,
it meant that an attorney had a duty to his client. He was to pro-
mote, as well as he could, the interests of this client. Second, he
was to secure the integrity of the legal system. Of course, these
two duties could conflict, but the profession elaborated a common
law of accommodation. Since an attorney was expected to act con-
sistently with this accommodation, i.e., consistently with his de-
fined professional role, society could efficiently predict his
conduct. This helped the social machine to run smoothly.
The public good of society prospered at the expense of the pri-
vate conscience of the organization employee and the professional
attorney. In a sense, both were slaves to different masters, the or-
ganization and the professional role, respectively. To be disloyal to
either meant-at least potentially---dismissal or professional cen-
sure.
But the system worked, for few single persons were ever sub-
ject to both masters. Professional attorneys did not generally work
for organizations. Lawyers primarily practiced on their own. At
most, they had one or two partners. Whatever decisions they had
to make, they made as independent professionals. Each was free
to do what his professional conscience dictated. If a client insisted
that her lawyer tell the jury that she was innocent when she was
not, the lawyer could easily refuse. Of course, this does not imply
that there were no adverse consequences to an attorney's choice of
conduct. A client could discharge her attorney. But few attorneys
relied on one or two clients, and therefore, for most, the loss of one
or two was financially acceptable.
Throughout this century, the organization and professional
models have remained constant while the world has changed. The
organization model remains the regime for much of the private
productive world. This is true in spite of governmental, statutory
and union inroads which limit employer discretion. Additionally,
the professional model, as described, remains the norm for attor-
neys. But, while once the attorney worked alone, she has now
gone to work for lay and law organizations. And while once she
looked only to her profession for standards, she now looks to both
2. W. HARBAUGH, LAWYER'S LAWYER: THE LIFE oF JoHN W. DAVIS 199 (1973)
(quoting letter from John W. Davis to Julia McDonald (Feb. 15, 1899)).
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the organization and the profession for guidance. Today, she fears
both dismissal and disbarment. For example, an attorney may
work for a large law firm, and she may disagree with a senior part-
ner over whether an attorney can properly represent both a hus-
band and wife in a divorce suit. How can she satisfy both her
professional role and her organizational superior? At the same
time, an attorney may work in the law department of a lay corpora-
tion. Her superiors may order her to negotiate directly with a lay
competitor whom the attorney knows to be represented by coun-
sel. Her professional norms define this conduct as unethical. She
may refuse to negotiate, but she does so at the severe risk of losing
her job. Resolving this dilemma of two masters is the most chal-
lenging problem facing professional attorneys today.
H. ONE TENTATIVE ANSWER
There are several ways of alleviating the modern attorney's
problem. At one extreme, one can attack the organization model.
One can insist that persons have the same rights during working
hours as they do on their own time. They cannot be punished or
dismissed for exercising these liberties. For example, if a person
would generally be free to criticize the policies of a major corpora-
tion, that person, even as an employee, should continue to be free
to criticize the corporation. The organization would not be able to
fire her for exercising these rights. But such a model would make
organization management extremely difficult and inefficient, sacri-
ficing the ultimate societal goal of the public good to the demands
of private conscience. At the other extreme, one can attack the
professional model. One can insist that the attorney has only one
duty-to serve her employer well. The duty to secure the integrity
of the legal system would be forfeited. Loyalty would not only be
an important organizational ethic, but it would become an equally
important professional ethic. If an attorney-employee did not do
what she was told, she could be fired with impunity.3 Such a re-
gime would make organization management easy. But such a
model would destroy an important element of the current profes-
sional role, which is, in part, the duty to insure the integrity of the
legal system.
I want to explore the plausibility of another answer. Instead of
3. Traditionally, the client has had the right to dismiss an attorney for any rea-
son. This suggestion does not eliminate that right. The proposal herein only
provides a remedy in tort for a wrongful discharge. This is not different in
concept from an attorney's right in contract when he is dismissed contrary to
the terms of the contract. Moreover, it is not certain that the staff attorney's




dramatically changing the organization model or completely re-
structuring the professional model, why not leave them essentially
as they are, but provide the attorney in the private organization
tenure by common law. In other words, why not provide a wrong-
fully discharged attorney-employee a judicial remedy?
Ill. TENURE
The concept of tenure in this context is not a difficult one. It
means that an employer who hires a professional hires him to do a
professional's job, that is, to play the professional role. Tenure will
protect the attorney-employee from a remediless discharge based
merely on the fact that he was disloyal, when the disloyal acts or
omissions constituted mandated professional conduct; that is,
when the acts or omissions were required by the professional role.
It will not protect him from discharge for other reasons, or for no
reasons, or because he played the role incompetently. The concept
is not designed to unduly limit the employer's freedom, or to insist
that it cannot rid itself of incompetent (in its own view) profes-
sionals. It is designed to encourage the attorney to play his role in
a professional way.
But why would an employer want to fire an attorney for acting
as an attorney ought to act? One reason is that there might be dif-
ferences of opinion as to what acts are entailed by the professional
role. As noted earlier, what constitutes the professional role. will
be a balance among conflicting duties. The professional group will
have developed its common law accommodation. The employer
might insist on a different accommodation and demand that an at-
torney who works for it be what the employer wants, and do what
the employer wants. Tenure will protect the employee from a rem-
ediless discharge for not sacrificing his professional conscience
and becoming merely a "team-player."
This may be made clearer by examining the concept of tenure
in an area in which the term is more familiar-the world of the
academic professional. A professor may have a duty to devote a
substantial amount of time to student relations. In a sense, this is
a duty to the client. The professor may also have a duty to the
academic process to research and to inquire. The university may
insist that the second duty be ignored, and it may require the pro-
fessor to spend all of her time with her students. The tenured pro-
fessor could not be fired for refusing such a demand if the
professional group defined her role (i.e., her job) as requiring re-
search efforts. The university's concept of the role may not be sub-
stituted for the professional group's concept.
The attractiveness of the tenure concept for the attorney should
now be clear. To continue with this illustration, the professor
19801
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needs security to do her job, because it requires a delicate balanc-
ing between duty to the student and duty to the academic process,
and because the university might insist on a job definition different
from the professional balance of duties. The attorney in the organ-
ization also needs security to do his job, because it too requires a
delicate balancing between duty to the client and duty to the legal
process, and the attorney's employer might insist on a job defini-
tion different from the professional accommodation of duties.
It is important to emphasize that tenure is not designed to pro-
tect the personal, moral or political conscience of the employee. It
is not a license to act as she wishes. The protection is only
designed to protect the attorney who acts, in fact, in professionally
required ways. It is possible that the individual employee, as well
as the employer, might misjudge what the professional accommo-
dation is. This will be true regardless of whether the employer is a
lay corporation or a law firm. In the latter case, however, the em-
ployer and the employee will both couch their arguments by ap-
peals to professional norms. This will confuse the issue, but it will
not change it. Either party could be wrong. The tenured em-
ployee-attorney ought to be protected from discharge only if his
view of what the role entails is the correct one.
Finally, there may not be a single acceptable professional role
for the situation. The profession itself may have left the resolution
ambiguous, or there may even be conflicting, but acceptable, no-
tions of the role. In these circumstances, it seems preferable not to
afford the attorney-employee tenure. The employer may not insist
that the attorney-employee act contrary to the professional norms,
but it ought to be able to insist that its employee do what it wants,
as long as the activity is acceptable to the professional group.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
The courts are probably the best governmental institution to
implement this concept. They should develop a tort of "wrongful
discharge." This will be the legal way to enforce the concept of
tenure. The concept has been articulated here on an abstract
plane, and to bring it down to earth will require social experimen-
tation. Courts are the best institutions to do this, for each disputed
case will be grounded in the particular facts of the instance. A
number of important issues-such as: how to define the role, which
professional group or institution to look to for guidance, how to rel-
egate proof obligations, whether to limit the remedy to compensa-
tory damages only-will have to be decided. Until we know more
about the problem, these issues cannot be addressed with confi-
dence. Admittedly, such a gradualist approach may surprise some,
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but as the common law develops the applications of the "wrongful
discharge" tort, it will become clearer.
V. PLAUSIBILITY
Most courts still insist that the organization model is the law. A
private employer can fire an employee for any reason, or for no
reason. But there is evidence which indicates that this "wrongful
discharge" suggestion is plausible.
The organization model has been dramatically limited, not only
in the public sector, but also in the private sector.4 Statutes and
labor contracts prohibit employers from dismissing employees for
reasons of sex, religion, race, etc. Nor may employers fire union
workers for other than "just cause." These developments of the
last fifty years indicate a shift in social priorities from an emphasis
on efficiency to an emphasis on fairness. The tenure concept here
does not even go that far, for it merely attempts to assure that the
attorney can play his role, thus enhancing efficiency.
The courts have confronted a similar problem in the landlord-
tenant area. The law had been that a landlord could evict a tenant
at will for any reason, or for no reason. This paralleled the organi-
zation model of employment law. In Edwards v. Habib,5 and sub-
sequent cases, the defense of retaliatory eviction was developed.
A landlord was precluded from terminating the landlord-tenant re-
lationship if his motive was to retaliate for legitimate tenant activ-
ity, such as filing complaints with housing code authorities. The
judiciary struck at the very heart of the traditional law of property;
if it was willing to do it there, it may be willing to do it in the em-
ployment area.6
In recent years, there has been an enormous amount of discus-
sion with respect to the proper role of an attorney engaged in cor-
porate and Securities and Exchange Commission practice. In
short, some very influential persons have suggested that an attor-
ney's obligation to the public, or to the SEC, outweighs what many
persons had believed was his primary obligation to his client. Al-
though it has not been suggested that an attorney should be pro-
tected from wrongful discharge, some have suggested that the
4. The Federal Constitution has been used to limit the organization model in
the public sector. See Givhan v. Western Line ConsoL School Dist., -U.S.-,
99 S.Ct. 693 (1979).
5. 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
6. At least one court has already struck such a blow. In Monge v. Beebe Rubber
Co., 114 N.H1 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974), the court held that termination by the
employer of a contract of employment at will which was motivated by bad
faith, malice, or is based on retaliation constitutes a breach of the employ-
ment contract. See Annot., 62 A.L.R.3d 271 (1975).
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reasons for an attorney's dismissal should be made public. This
certainly would deter wrongful discharge, and thus encourage
proper professional behavior.7
Finally, there is perhaps an emerging right to private employ-
ment in circumstances close to those under discussion. Two cases
in the last five years, and one earlier case, support the proposition
that some courts will award damages to a discharged employee if
the court believes that to sanction the dismissal would jeopardize
the integrity of the legal system.
In Nees v. Hocks,8 the Oregon Supreme Court held that an em-
ployee could not be discharged for telling the court clerk that she
wanted to serve on jury duty, even though her employer had told
her to request to be excused. The court concluded that the "com-
munity's interest in having its citizens serve on jury duty [is] so
important that an employer, who interferes with that interest by
discharging an employee who served on a jury, should be required
to compensate his employee .... 9
In Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co.,1o Frampton was fired
because she filed a workmen's compensation claim. Although the
Indiana Supreme Court justified its decision by an appeal to the
language of the workmen's compensation statute, the court was
fundamentally concerned with protecting the right of access to the
legal system-in other words, in protecting the integrity of the sys-
tem. To protect this interest, Frampton was allowed to sue for
wrongful discharge.
Two decades ago, in Petermann v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters," Petermann, a union employee, was discharged be-
cause he would not lie to a legislative investigatory committee. Al-
though the California Court of Appeals conceded the employer's
general right to dismiss an employee "for any reason whatsoever,"
to permit the exercise of this right in this case would have jeopar-
7. The SEC has recently circulated the following rule for comment:
When a reporting corporation's general counsel or any attorney
retained in connection with matters pertaining to the laws adminis-
tered or enforced by the Commission resigns or is dismissed, the cor-
poration shall file with the Commission Form 8-K, describing the
circumstances of the resignation or dismissal. Prior to submission of
the Form 8-K to the Commission the corporation shall provide the
resigning or dismissed attorney with an opportunity to comment on
the accuracy and completeness of the description. The attorney's
comments shall become part of the corporation's submission to the
Commission.
SEC Release No. 16045, 44 Fed. Reg. 44881, 44883 (1979).
8. 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
9. Id. at 218, 536 P.2d at 516.
10. 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
11. 174 Cal. App.2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
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dized the integrity of the legal system. Petermann was permitted
to sue for wrongful discharge because the 'presence of false testi-
mony in any proceeding tends to interfere with the proper admin-
istration of public affairs and the administration of justice."1 2
The cases are few, and as we have noted, are contrary to most
other cases. But they suggest that if a balance must be struck be-
tween protecting the integrity of the legal system or adhering to
the organization model, the courts might support the former. This
would seem especially true in the case of an employee-attorney
who, because of his professional role, is charged with a special re-
sponsibility to protect the integrity of the legal system.
This last point-that a professional is to be given special consid-
eration when he acts in furtherance of or according to professional
norms-was emphasized in Geary v. United States Steel Corp.13
Geary, a salesman for United States Steel for fourteen years, com-
plained to his superior that a particular product was unsafe. His
superior told him to "follow directions," but since he still had res-
ervations, he expressed them to a vice-president of his division.
Partially as a result of his efforts, the product was taken off the
market. As a result of his circumvention of the corporate chain of
command, he was discharged. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
in a four-to-three decision, denied his claim for wrongful discharge.
In explaining this result, Justice Pomeroy suggested that the deci-
sion might have been different had Geary had a professional obli-
gation to concern himself with product safety. The justice wrote:
Certainly, the potential for abuse of an employer's power of dismissal is
particularly serious where an employee must exercise independent, ex-
pert judgment in matters of product safety, but Geary does not hold him-
self out as this sort of employee.... There is no suggestion that he
possessed any expert qualifications, or that his duties extended to making
judgments in matters of product safety.14
It seems plausible, in light of Geary, to suggest that if he had been
an expert professional employee, as an attorney, with his duty to
protect the integrity of the legal system, he would have been pro-
tected.
VI. SUMMARY
Tenure for attorneys in private enterprise is not now with us.
However, given some courts' appreciation that a too rigid adher-
ence to the organization model may jeopardize the integrity of the
legal system and that professional attorneys, even in an organiza-
tion, have a special charge to guard the integrity of the system, it is
12. Id. at 188, 344 P.2d at 27.
13. 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974).
14. Id. at 181, 319 A.2d 178-79 (footnote omitted).
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conceivable that future courts will develop the tort of "wrongful
discharge" and, in effect, grant the attorney the security to do his
job and to play his role according to professional standards.
